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LEGAL BACKGROUND IN THE CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW

A.

A Note on the Terms "Frustration"and "Commercial"

George Bernard Shaw is reputed to have said that "England and
America are two countries separated by a common language."1 In the
United States the term "frustration" is limited to situations where it is
possible to perform the contract, but performance would be senseless.
The usual illustration is a license for the use of an apartment to view the
coronation procession of King Edward VII. Although the coronation was
postponed because of the King's illness, it was still possible for the
licensee to pay for the use of the apartment and for the licensor to provide
the apartment, nevertheless the basic assumption of the parties did not
occur. Therefore, the purpose of the contract was totally frustrated, and
the contract was discharged. In England, "frustration" is used to cover
cases of impossibility of performance as well as cases such as described
in the above illustration. I will follow the American usage which
separates impossibility cases from frustration cases.2
The word "commercial" or some close variation of it is used in
many languages. This does not mean that, outside their core meanings,
these terms have the same scope, particularly when used in a legal
context. The term "commercial contract" has no precise meaning in the
English language. It certainly describes more contracts than are covered
by the Uniform Commercial Code that is in effect in 49 of the 50 states of
the United States. Some jurisdictions have commercial codes of much
broader coverage than that of the Uniform Commercial Code. 3 The
meaning of "commercial" in the UNIDROIT Principles cannot be based
on its meaning in any one legal system; it is best inferred from the
illustrations utilized in the Principles. These include, for example,
construction contracts, 4 corporate acquisitions, 5 contracts for technical
This Article was delivered at a conference held at the Universidad Panamericana in Mexico
City, November 12-14, 1996, entitled Seminario Sobre Contratos Intemacionales: Reglas de
UNIDRO1T para Contratacion Comercial en America del Norte.
1.
P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo.American Comparisons, 1987
DuKE L.J. 1002, 1005 n.14 (citing H. PRoCNow & H. PROCHNOW, JR., A TREAsURy oF
HUMOROUS QUOTATIoNS 129 (1969)).
2.
For English terminology, see G.H. TRm-, FRUSTRATIO AND FORCE MAJEURE §§ 2044 to 2-050 (1994).
3.
See generally Alejandro M. Garro, The Contribution of the UNIDROIT Principles to
the Advancement of InternationalCommercialArbitration,3 TuL J. INT'L & COr, . L. 93, 99 n.33
(1995) [hereinafter Garro, Contribution].
4.
See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, art. 2.4 illus. 2 (1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT PRNCiPLES]; see also id.
pmbl. 2.
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assistance, and contracts for architectural services. 6 So wide-ranging are
the illustrations that there is little room for international noncommercial
contracts.
B.

TraditionalDoctrine

Traditional doctrine in both the systems of common law and civil
law have solidly supported the doctrine of pacta sunt servandaagreements must be kept though the heavens fall. The major exceptions
in civil and common law systems are the doctrines of impossibility of
performance, sometimes denominated "force majeure," and frustration of
the venture. In many legal systems this traditional doctrine continues to
receive solid support, and relief for hardship is limited to these two
doctrines. "Either performance is made impossible by force majeure and
the contract disappears or the performance is impossible and the contract
has to be performed, at whatever cost."'7 In others, hardship provides an
additional ground for the discharge of a contract or for its adaptation to
changed circumstances.
The traditional rule that hardship, short of impossibility, is no
excuse for nonperformance of a contract, and the modem rule providing
relief on grounds of hardship are not the only solutions employed by legal
systems. The United States flirts with a vaguely defined doctrine of
impracticability. 8 France refuses relief for hardship as to contracts in the
private sector, 9 but gives relief under the doctrine of imprdvision (the
unforeseen) in administrative tribunals for supervening hardship in the
performance of government contracts. 10

5.
See id art. 2.2 illus. 2.
6.
See id. art. 7.4.2 illus. 6.
7.
Denis Tallon, ImprivisionRevisited: Some Remarks on the Consequence of a Change
of Circumstanceson Contracts,in BINDING FORcE OF CONTRACt 106, 108 (Budapest Institute for
Legal and Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1991).
8.
See JOHN D. CAL.AMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THm LAW OF CONTRACrS § 13-9 (3d ed.
1987); E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, CoNmAcrS § 9.6, at 710-13 (2d ed. 1990); JOHN EDWARD
MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRAcrs § 112, at 641-47 (3d ed. 1990).
9.
Special legislation to meet special post-war conditions was enacted on Jan. 21, 1918,
and April 22, 1949. Where there is impossibility, French law excuses. Where impossibility merely
delays performance, the court can extend the contract. If there is partial impossibility, the court can
reduce the price. See Pierre Legrand, Jr., JudicialRevision of Contracts in FrenchLaw: A CaseStudy, 62 Tut. L. REv. 963, 1038-44 (1988). See also Jean-Louis Baudouin, Theory ofImprivision
and JudicialInterventionto Change a Contract,in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF OBLATIONS 151
(Joseph Dainow ed., 1969).
10. See generallyBaudouin, supra note 9.
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England firmly claims to stand on the traditional rule: "A
contract will only be [discharged] if the substance of it has become
impossible or illegal, or the commercial purpose has been completely
destroyed."11 Yet consider the case of Staffordshire Area Health
Authority v. South Staffordshire Waterworks Co. 12 A waterworks
company had agreed to provide a hospital "at all times hereafter" with its
requirements of water at fixed prices. 13 Decades later, the other
ratepayers were paying a rate that was over 18 times greater than the
agreed prices promised to the hospital. 14 The supplier gave 7 months
notice of termination of the contract. 15 The Court of Appeal held that the
notice effectively terminated the contract. 16 One of the three judges, Lord
Denning M.R., 17 held that even if the contract had been perpetual in
duration, the contract should be discharged on grounds of changed
circumstances, 18 although this line of reasoning had been disapproved by
the House of Lords in British Movietone News Ltd. v. London District
Cinemas.19 The other two judges took the path of interpreting the
contract as one for indefinite duration, and therefore terminable upon
reasonable notice. 20 This approach, however, cannot be taken in England
when the contract has a definite period of duration that cannot be
interpreted away. Belgium also adheres to the traditional doctrine; force
majeure is recognized as an excuse, but unforeseen hardship is neither an
excuse nor grounds for revision of the contract. 21 Yet other doctrines
have occasionally been employed to redress hardship, and force majeure
has been found where performance was possible but extremely costly and
strained interpretation has also been employed to redress hardship. 22 The

11. Hugh Beale, Adaptation to Changed Circumstance, Specific Performance and
Remedies Report on EnglishLaw, in BINDING FoRCE OFCONTRAC, supra note 7, at 9,20.
12. [1978] W.L.R. 1387 (Eng.).
13. See Treitel, supra note 2, at § 6-034 & 269 n.1 1 (quoting StaffordshireArea Health,
[1978] W.L.R. at 1387).
14. See id. § 6-034 (discussing StaffordshireArea Health, [1978] W.L.R. at 1387).
15. See id. (discussing StaffordshireArea Health, [1978] W.L.R. at 1387).
16. See id. (discussingStaffordshireArea Health, [1978] W.L.R. at 1387).
17. See id. (citing StaffordshireArea Health, [1978] W.L.R. at 1394).
18. See id. (citing StaffordshireArea Health, [1978] W.L.R. at 1398).
19. [1952] A.C. 166 (Eng.). See Treitel, supra note 2, § 6-034 (discussing British
Movietone News Ltd. v. London District Cinemas, [1951] 1 KB. 190).
20. See Treitel, supra note 2, § 6-034 & -270 n.17 (citing StaffordshireArea Health, [1978]
W.L.R. at 1399).
21. See JACQUEs HERBoTs, CONTRACT LAw INBELGIUM [350-55 (1995); Denise Philippe,
Belgian ContractLaw: Some Principles,in BINDING FORCE OFCONTRACr, supranote 7, at 87,88.
22. See HERBOTS, supra note 21, 1 350-55; Denise Philippe, Belgian ContractLaw: Some
Principles,in BiNDING FORCEOFCONTRACr, supra note 7, at 87,88.
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Convention on the International Sale of Goods (Convention or CISG) is
silent on the question of hardship. Therefore, the UNIDROIT Principles
23
can be used to supplement the Convention.
C.

Modem Approach to Hardship

After World War I, the German economy was devastated by
inflation of an almost incredible scale; the mark ultimately sunk to onetrillionth of its former value. Although the German Civil Code explicitly
granted relief for hardship only in cases of impossibility, the courts
ultimately held that they could give relief for hardship as an emanation of
the principle of good faith also found in the German Civil Code.
Professor Paul Oertmann developed the theory of the Wegfall der
24
Geschiiftsgrundlage-disappearanceof the foundations of the contract.
Germany's high court seized upon this theory and ruled that legal tender
no longer had to be accepted in payment of debts, as no debtor could in
good faith make such a tender.25 As the case law has evolved, the party
who is unduly burdened because of changed circumstances may obtain a
discharge of the contract, or the court can adapt the contract to changed
circumstances if both parties want the contract to continue. 26 The
changed circumstances must be exceptional and the court must balance

23. For an argument to the effect that because of the silence of CISG on the subject, the
UNIDROIT Principles can be used to supplement the Convention, see Alejandro M. Garro, The
Gap-FillingRole of the UNIDROIT Principlesin InternationalSales Law: Some Comments on the
Interplay Between the Principlesand the CISG, 69 TuL L. REv. 1149, 1182-84 (1995) [hereinafter
Garro, Gap-Filling]. On the UNIDROIT Principles, see generally M. JOACHM BONELL, AN
INTERNAToNALRESrATEr.ENT OFCoNTRAcrLAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
Co.,%RcLACo,,RAcrs (1994) [hereinafter BoNE, INTRNm
ATIONAL RESrATaEmr]; M. Joachim
Bonell, Unification of Law by Non-Legislative Means: The UNIDROIT Draft Principlesfor
InternationalCommercial Contracts,40 Am. J. Comp. L. 617 (1992); Pilar Perales Viscasillas,
UNIDROIT Principlesof InternationalCommercialContexts: Sphere of Application and General
Provisions,13 ARIz. J. INT'L& Comp. L. 381 (1996); and Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROITPrinciples
of InternationalCommercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAm L. REV.
281 (1994).
24. See John P. Dawson, JudicialRevision of FrustratedContracts: Germany, 63 B.U.L.
REV. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (discussing P. OERTmANN, DIE GESCHAFrSGUNDLAGE, EN NEuER
RECHTSBEGRIFF (1921)).
25. See id. at 1047-48 & n.21 (citing to 107 RGZ 78 and P. OERTMANN, DIE
AuFvERTUNGSFRAGE 40 (1924)); see also ARTHuR NuSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAw 206-11 (1950);
KETH S. RosENN, LAW AND INFLATION 84-94 (1982); John P. Dawson, Effects of Inflation on
Private Contracts: Germany 1914-24,33 MICH. L. REV. 171 (1935).
26. See Peter Hay, Frustrationand Its Solution in German Law, 10 AM. J. Co,1. L. 345,
360(1961).
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the interests of both parties. 27 Courts of other countries have followed the
30
German lead, including Switzerland, 28 Argentina 29 and Brazil.
Other countries have reached the same result by legislation, Italy
in 1942,31 Greece in 1946,32 and more recently the Netherlands. 33 The
Netherlands Code provides as follows:
1. Upon the demand of one of the parties, the judge
may modify the effects of a contract, or he may set it aside
in whole or in part on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances which are of such a nature that the cocontracting party, according to criteria of reasonableness
and equity, may not expect that the contract be maintained
in an unmodified form. The modification or the setting
aside of the contract may be given retroactive force.
2. The modification or the setting aside of the
contract is not pronounced to the extent that the person
invoking the circumstances should be accountable for
them according to the contract or common opinion.
3. For the purposes of this article, a person to whom
a contractual right or obligation has been transferred, is
34
assimilated to a contracting party.
Thus, the modem trend, exemplified by the Netherlands Code, is
to recognize the established doctrines of impossibility of performance and
frustration of the venture and to add to them a doctrine of excessive
hardship. Under this trend, where, because of changed circumstances, a
contract has become excessively burdensome on one of the parties, the
party subjected to that burden may request a discharge of the contract, or,
alternatively, its modification to reflect an exchange of values in
accordance with market values at the time of the changed circumstances.

27. See id
28. See Hans Smit, Frustrationof Contract: A ComparativeAttempt at Consolidation,58
CoLuM. L. REV. 287,289-96 (1958).
29. See KErH S. RosENN, LAW AND INFLATION 87-88 (1982).
30. See id.at 88.
31. See CODICECIVILE arts. 1467-1469 (Italy) (Mario Beltramo et al. trans., 1991).
32. See GREEK CVM CODE art. 388. An English translation can be found in RUDOLF B.
ScLaEsiNGE Er AL, COMPARATVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERLAMS 737 (5th ed. 1988).
33. See NEw NErERLANDS CvL CODE Patrimonial Law art 6:258 (P.P.C Haanappel &
Ejan Mackaay trans., 1990); Arthur S. Hartkamp, The Binding Force of Contractin Dutch Law, in
BINDING FORCE OF CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 41, 46.

34.

NEw NETHERLANDs CiViL CODE Patrimonial Law, supra note 33, art. 6:258.
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CONTRACruAL USAGES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

If.

Although many legal systems do not generally give relief to a
party who is burdened with excessive hardship, these same systems
generally recognize party autonomy to provide for the adaptation of
contracts to changed circumstances. Consequently, it is fairly common in
contracts dealing with international trade, particularly those that have long
durations, to make provision for revision of the contract in case of
changed circumstances. Such a clause might read as follows:
At any time during the term of this Agreement the
Government and the Company may consult with each
other to determine whether in the light of all relevant
circumstances the financial or other provisions of this
Agreement need revision in order to ensure that the
Agreement operates equitably and without major
detriment to the interests of either party.
Such
circumstances shall include the conditions under which
the mineral production is carried out such as the size,
location, and overburden of mineral deposits, the quality
of the mineral, the market conditions for the mineral, the
prevailing purchasing power of money and the terms and
conditions prevailing for comparable mineral ventures. In
reaching agreement on any revision of this Agreement
pursuant to this Article both parties shall ensure that no
revision of this Agreement shall prejudice the Company's
ability to retain financial credibility abroad and to raise
finance by borrowing internationally in a manner and on
terms normal to the mining industry. 35
Sophisticated international trade agreements of long duration
typically contain a renegotiation or other adaptation clause that provides
flexibility to the relationship-so typical as to perhaps rise to the strength
of a usage. 36 The absence of such a clause may reflect that such a clause
has been rejected by one or both parties, but is more likely to have been
overlooked by unsophisticated parties or deliberately omitted by a
sophisticated drafter. 37 In the last two cases, the court should consider the
35.
36.

MARTINBARTES, CONTRACTUALADAFrATIONAND CoNFUcrREsoLurIoN59(1985).
See UGO DRAEITA Er AL, BREAcH AND ADAPTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CoNTRAcrs:

170-214 (1992); Norbert Horn, Standard Clauses on
Contract Adaptation in International Commerce, in ADAPTATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF
CoNTAcrs ININTERNATIONALTRADE AND FINAN CE 31 (Norbert Horn ed., 1985).
37. See Garro, Gap-Filling,supra note 23, at 1160-63.
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEX MERCATOmA
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contracts as having an omitted term and fill the gap with the help of the
UNIDROIT Principles. 38 As Corbin wrote:
In order to prevent the disappointment of
expectations that the transaction aroused in one party, as
the other had reason to know, the courts find and enforce
promises that were not put into words, by interpretation
when they can and by implication and construction when
they must. When unforeseen contingencies occur, not
provided for in the contract, the courts require
performance as men who deal fairly and in good faith
with each other would perform without a law suit. It is
thus that unanticipated risks are fairly distributed and a
party is prevented from making unreasonable gains at the
expense of the other. This is not making a contract for the
parties; it is declaring what the legal operation of their
own contract shall be, in view of the actual course of
events in accordance with those business mores known as
39
good faith and fair dealing.
III.

THE UNDERPNNINGS OF THE FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHmI

ExcuSEs
What are the bases of the excuses for impossibility, frustration,
impracticability, or hardship? What are the value judgments that have
guided legislators and courts in these areas? In the common law systems,
contract liability is no-fault liability, yet some leeway for an excuse has
been allowed. Although in some civil law countries, fault is perceived to
have a greater role in contract liability than in the common law, the
discussions of these excuses do not seem affected in any important way
40
by ideas related to fault or its absence.
One trend of thought about the foundations of these excuses
stems from one of the principal underpinnings of contractual obligations.
Contract liability stems from consent. If an event occurs that is totally
outside the contemplation of the parties and the event drastically shifts the
nature of foreseen contractual risks, is there truly consent? Under this line
of thinking, one can infer that the parties did not intend that performance
38.

See Perillo,supra note 23, at 301-02; Garro, Contribution,supra note 3, at 122-23.
ARTHUR LINON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACIS § 541, at 97 (1960).
40. For an explanation of why this is so, see generally Barry Nicholas, Force Majeure and
Frustration,27 AM. J. COMP. L. 231 (1979).

39.
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would have to be rendered if an unexpected event would create a radical
change in the nature of performance. If this inference is sound, one can
conclude that the contract did not cover the unexpected event that has
occurred. Under this reasoning, the court must then supply a term to
cover an omitted case. Thus viewed, relief for impossibility or hardship
does not interfere with freedom of contract. If this is so, the next question
is how is the court to fill the gap and provide for the omitted case? A
useful analogy is cases decided on the basis of mistake of fact. The
distinction is that the doctrine of mistake is applicable only if there is a
mistake as to a material existing fact, while ordinarily impossibility,
frustration, and hardship relate to future events. In cases of mistake, ideas
of unjust enrichment are heavily involved. Before applying any relief
based on mistake, one must search the facts for unexpected, unbargainedfor gain on the one hand and unexpected, unbargained-for loss on the
other. Notions similar to that of the civil law notion of laesio enormis and
common law notions of conscionability are also involved. 41 It is
unconscionably sharp practice to take advantage of the mistakes of fact
made by the other contracting party. It may equally be deemed
unconscionable to take advantage of a mistake as to the course of future
events. Public international law has long recognized the principle of
rebus sic stantibus,an implied term in every treaty that it will cease to be
binding when the facts and conditions on which they were based have
fundamentally changed.42 This implied term has its origins in the Roman
law of contract. The full Latin text is: Contractus qui habent tractum
succesivum et dependentiam defuturun, rebus sic stantibus intelligentur.
Freely translated, the phrase is: "Contracts providing for successive acts
of performance over a future period of time must be understood as subject
to the condition that the circumstances will remain the same. ' '43
41. Some scholars see a distinct link between ideas of good faith and conscionability and
rules with respect to force majeure and hardship. See the quotation from Corbin, supra text
accompanying note 39; see also Hemany Veytia, The Requirement of Justice and Equity in
Contracts,69 TUL L. REv. 1191, 1205-06 (1995). Professor Farnsworth prefers to consider these
concepts as distinct. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and FairDealing Under the
UNIDROIT Principles,Relevant InternationalConventions, and National Laws, 3 TuL J.INT'L &
COMp. L. 47,60-61 (1994).
42. See, e.g., David Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration,Rebus Sic Stantibus and a
PrimitivistView of the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988). Civil law writers often invoke
the maxim in contract analysis. See, e.g., STEFAN SCHMiDuN, FRUSTRATION OF CONRAcr uND
CLAusuLA REBUs Sic STANImUS (1985); Jorge J. Oppenheimer Mendez, El Rebus Sic Stantibus
Como Defensa Dentro del Derecho Puertoriqueno,28 REvisrA DE DERECHO PUERTORIQUENO 23

(1988).
43. Saul Litvinoff, Force Majeure, Failure of Cause and Theorie de L'Imprivision:
Louisiana Law and Beyond, 46 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985). Louisiana, to a large extent a civil law
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Involved are cultural beliefs about unjust enrichment and unjust
impoverishment. These terms engage our cultural values. What may
have been deemed unjust in the middle ages, when the very morality of
making a profit was questioned, is viewed differently today. Such values
differ not only over time, but also over space. The morality and
legitimacy of profit are viewed in one light in Beijing and in another in
Havana (although both profess Marxism) and perhaps less dramatically,
but still differently, in London than in Rome.
All contracts involve risks. Some contracts are almost purely
aleatory. If one sells shares of stock on the stock exchange that person
does not have, the so-called "short sale," it is a contract of pure risk, and I
can conceive no circumstance (absent fraud, duress, or other vitiating
cause) in which a court should relieve the seller or buyer from a total loss,
even if unexpected and unforeseeable events disrupted the market. On
the other hand, in the more typical contract involving the sale of goods or
services, or the rental of real estate, each party expects to gain from the
contract and each party understands that the other party also expects to
gain. In such contracts, neither party expects to gain from the other's loss,
although both realize that such an imbalance may occur. In the common
law, several kinds of events produce an almost automatic excuse for
nonperformance: death of a person who is to personally perform,
supervening illegality of a performance, and the destruction of the subject
matter. When one goes beyond these three categories, relief is most
justified if unexpected events inflict a loss on one party and provide a
windfall gain for the other, or where the excuse would save one party
from an unexpected loss while leaving the other party in a position no
worse than it would have without the contract. 44
IV.

THE UNIDROlT PRINCIPLES

A.

ForceMajeure (Impossibilityof Performance)

This Article will now proceed with a more detailed review of the
relevant provisions. First, force majeure will be discussed followed by a
discussion of the provisions concerning hardship.

jurisdiction, does not give relief for hardship. See, e.g., Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc.,
521 So. 2d 1234, 1240 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
44. See Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of JudicialReconstructionof Contracts,71 INm. L.J. 45,

55 (1995).
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The UNIDROIT Principles deal with force majeure in the chapter
on nonperformance. 45 Hardship is dealt with in the chapter on
performance. 46 The logic of this divided treatment is clear. If
performance is impossible it will not be performed; whether the
nonperformance is excused or will be the basis for a money judgment for
damages or restitution is a question dealt with under nonperformance. If
performance is burdensome, the consequences of the burden are dealt
with as an aspect of performance.
The provisions on force majeure47 are rigid. Nothing less than
total impossibility will suffice as a predicate for an excuse. There must
have been an "impediment beyond [the party's] control" and the party
"could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or
overcome it or its consequences." 48 Let us analyze the quoted language.
"Impedimentbeyond [the party's] control

'49

Three American cases illustrate this phrase. In Peckham v.
IndustrialSecurities Co.,50 a receiver was appointed to seize the assets of
the seller, including goods that were the subject of the contract. 5 1 The
Delaware Supreme Court held that the seller was to be excused only
because the appointment of the receiver was wrongful and not due to the
seller's own conduct. 52 In another case, Lowenschuss v. Kane,53 a
temporary injunction preventing the delivery of shares of stock was issued
against the buyer based on alleged violations of the antitrust and securities
laws. 54 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that buyers are to be excused and are not to be held liable for breach if it is
45. UNIDROIT PRINciPLES, supra note 4, art. 7.1.7.
46. See id. arts. 6.2.1-6.2.3.
47. Article 7.1.7 is entitled "Force majeure." According to Comment 1 thereto, the "article
covers the ground covered in common law systems by the doctrines of frustration and
impossibility..... In part, the Comment conflicts with the black letter text which speaks of "an
impediment" to performance. In frustration cases, as that term is explained in the opening
paragraph of this Article, there is no impediment to performance. In the example given there of the
canceled coronation, it is merely a hardship on the licensee of the apartment to pay an extravagant
fee to view a street on which there would be no coronation procession. Consequently, cases of
frustration must be analyzed under the hardship provisions.
48. UNIDROIT PRINcIPLES, supra note 4, art. 7.1.7(1).
49. Id.
50. 113 A. 799 (Del. 1921).
51. See id. at 799.
52. See id. at 802.
53. 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975).
54. See id. at 258-59.
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found that there were no such violations. 55 In Canadian Industries
Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., OFN.,56 apparently involving
international commerce, a middleman promised delivery to the buyer of
one-and-a-half million gallons of blackstrap molasses from a specific
sugar refinery. 57 The seller failed to deliver and, in defense of a breach of
contract action, argued impossibility, proving that the specified refinery
did not produce a sufficient quantity to fulfill the contract. 58 The defense
was unsuccessful as the seller failed to show what efforts it had made to
attempt to secure a contract for the production and delivery of sufficient
59
molasses from the operator of the refinery.
What if the impediment is caused by the party's financial
embarrassment? Neither Article 7.1.7, nor the commentary to it, refers to
this kind of impediment. Under American law, it is quite clear that
financial impediments provide no excuse; these are regarded as
"subjective" rather than "objective" impossibility and there is unanimity
in the case law and in doctrine that subjective impossibility provides no
excuse, whether or not it was the result of conditions outside the control
of the obligor.60 It is generally believed that the risk of financial ability to
perform is such a basic assumption underlying all contracts that it cannot
be excused, except by a decree in a bankruptcy proceeding. It is hard to
believe that this general belief is suspended in international trade.
Consequently, the phrase "beyond [the party's] control" should be given a
broad meaning so that it will be deemed that financial health is always
within a contracting party's control.
"[The party] could not reasonablybe expected
to have taken the impediment into account
61
at the time of the conclusion of the contract"
This phrase raises the issue of foreseeability. 62 The question of
foreseeability is a difficult one. Anyone who has read a bit of history or
who has lived for three or more decades of the twentieth century can
55. See id. at 265-66. See also Studio #54 Disco, Inc. v. Pee Dee Jay Amusement Corp.,
439 N.Y.S.2d 395,397 (App. Div. 1981).
56. 179 N.E. 383 (N.Y. 1932).
57. See id. at 383-84.
58. See id. at 384.
59. See id. at 384-85.
60. See JOHND. CALAMARI&JOSEPHM. PER.to,THELAwoFCoNTRAcrS § 13-15 (3ded.
1987).
61. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, art. 7.1.7(1).
62. For use ofword "foreseeable," see id. art. 7.1.7 illus. 1(3).
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foresee, in a general way, the possibility of war, revolution, embargo,
plague, terrorism, hyper-inflation and economic depression, among the
other horrors that have afflicted the human race. If one reads science
fiction, one learns of the possibility of new terrors that have not yet
afflicted us, but involve possibilities that are not pure fantasy. The
following notion of unforeseeability seems sound-an event so unlikely
to occur that reasonable parties see no need explicitly to allocate the risk
of its occurrence, although the impact it might have would be of such
magnitude that the parties would have negotiated over it, had the event
been more likely.63 An Italian text summarizing some of the Italian cases
states:
As to a contract made in 1914 to last 60 years, the
outbreak of a war (or better, of a certain number of wars)
was foreseeable and also foreseeable was the
development of aerial arms and the resort to aerial
bombardments.... As to a contract made during the
second world war, the protracted duration of that war was
not foreseeable, nor were the proportions of its
64
consequences measurable.
One can reflect on the soundness of such distinctions of fact made
by the Italian courts. Similarly, one can reflect on the soundness of
decisions of American courts to the effect that American participation in
the second World War was foreseeable, 65 despite the fact that the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor found their armed forces totally
unprepared. Yet, American merchants were supposed to foresee the onset
of American participation in the War. Also, the American courts ruled
consistently that the closing of the Suez Canal in 1956 was foreseeable to
merchants who relied on the canal route. 66 It was again foreseeable in
1967 when the second canal closing took place. 67
It is difficult to believe that judges in reviewing the "factual"
question of foreseeability can refrain from taking into account the larger
consequences of a finding of foreseeability. If, in one case, American
entry into the second World War had been declared to be unforeseeable,
63. See Pietro Trimarchi, Commercial Impracticability in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis, 11 INT'LREv. L. &ECON. 63,65 n.4 (1991).
64.

RODOL-O SACCO & GIORGIO DE NOVA, ILCoNTRATrO 675 (Torino, UTET 1993).

65. See Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47,50-51 (Cal. 1944).
66. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312,318 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
67. See American Trading and Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 941,
943 (2d Cir. 1972).
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how many thousands, or tens of thousands of contracts would have to be
dissolved because of impossibility or frustration? How many shipping
and sales contracts would have been thwarted by the Suez closings? How
broadly would international trade be disrupted and how much uncertainty
would be injected into domestic and international trade? I suggest that it
is no accident-and I speak of the American and English cases only as I
have not made a sufficient study of others-that the courts are more
willing to find an excuse where the supervening event has drastic
consequences only for one contract 68 or a small number of contracts than
where the supervening event affects an enormous number of transactions.
"or to have avoided or overcome
69
it or its consequences"
Using the case InternationalPaper Co. v. Rockefeller70 as an
example, we find that if a party has breached by delay and an impediment
71
arises thereafter, the impediment will not excuse the nonperformance.
Much of the discussion concerning the phrase "beyond [the party's]
control" also applies here.
B.

Temporary ForceMajeure

Article 7.1.7 of the Principles provides that "[w]hen the
impediment is only temporary, the excuse shall have effect for such
period as is reasonable having regard to the effect of the impediment on
the performance of the contract." 72 The doctrine of impossibility,
temporary or otherwise, does not inhibit the other party's ability to cancel
the contract, it merely forgives damages. 73 Temporary impossibility
gives rise to prospective inability to perform. 74 Although the obligor may
be excused by temporary impossibility,7 5 the prospective inability will
normally give the obligee a power to suspend performance and demand
assurance of due performance. However, if the obligor is not able to
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See, e.g., Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Assoc., 518 P.2d 76, 85 (Alaska 1974).
UNlDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note4, art. 7.1.7(1).
146 N.Y.S. 371 (App. Div. 1914).
See id. at 374-75.
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supranote 4, art. 7.1.7(2).
See id art. 7.1.7 cmt. 2.
74. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONrRACrS § 269 cmt. a (1981) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; see also id. §§ 237 (Effect on Other Party's Duties of a Failure to Render
Perfonnance) & 238 (Effect on Other Party's Duties of a Failure to Offer Performance).
75. See, e.g., Colorado Coal Furnace Distribs. v. Prill Mfg., 605 F.2d 499, 504 (10th Cir.
1979).
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provide assurance of due performance, the obligee may cancel the
contract despite the impossibility that may provide a defense in an action
76
for damages.
If the obligee is not justified in canceling the contract or chooses
not to, what rules govern the conduct of the obligor? Obviously the
obligor may suspend performance. When the impossibility ceases, the
obligor is usually expected to perform in full and is entitled to an
appropriate extension of time for performance. 77 This is not, however, a
universal rule. When the delay will make performance substantially more
burdensome, the rules on hardship must be consulted.78 If the
impediment relates to the payment of money, as by governmental
currency controls, interest accrues on the debt, the payment of which is
79
impeded.
An illustration will serve to clarify these rules. 80 Madame
Poussard promised to sing the leading female role in a new opera being
produced by B. The first performance was to take place on November
28th. On November 23rd, Madame Poussard became ill during a
rehearsal. At this time the length of her illness was indefinite and
unknown. B hired the only other available substitute performer to take
Madame Poussard's place. The substitute insisted on being hired for the
entire performance and was so hired. Madame Poussard was ready to
perform on December 4th at which time she tendered her services, which
were refused. The jury found as a fact that the engagement of the
substitute was reasonable.
It is clear that Madame Poussard's illness was a defense to any
action for breach of contract that B might bring relating to the period of
illness. B undoubtedly could suspend performance during the period of
illness. However, B did more than suspend performance, B chose to
terminate the contract. The question was whether B was justified. In
doctrinal language there was a finding that there was serious prospective
inability to perform which justified B's cancellation of the contract. The
result probably would be different if Madame Poussard were able on
76. See UNIDROIT PmRciLEs, supra note 4, art. 7.3.4; see also id art. 7.1.7(4) ("Nothing
in this article prevents a party from exercising a right to terminate the contract or to withhold
performance or request interest on money due.").
77. See REsrATEmENT (SEcoND), supranote 74, § 269 cmt. a.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 96-149.
79. See UNIDROIT PRINCI'LES, supra note 4, art. 7.1.7(4).
80. The following illustration is derived from the facts of Poussardv. Spiers & Pond, 1
Q.B. 410 (Eng. 1876). While the case did not involve a commercial contract, it beautifully
illustrates the points made here.

TULANE J. OFINT'L & COMP.LAW

[Vol. 5

November 23 to give assurances that the illness would have lasted only
two or three days. 81 The rules stated here are over-ridden if one party has
82
assumed the risk in question by agreement or otherwise.
C.

Governmental Licenses and Permits

Four articles of the Principles and extensive commentary are
devoted to the obtaining of governmental permissions, certainly an
important topic in domestic trade and a more complex one in
international trade. Permits may be needed from more than one State or
there may be licensing requirements of which one or both parties may be
unaware. The burden of applying for any necessary governmental
approval is cast on the party who has its place of business in the State
whose approval is required, but only if the other party has no place of
business in the State.83 In any other case, for example, when neither party
has, or both parties have, a place of business in the State, the party whose
performance requires permission must take the necessary measures. 84
Where both parties' performances are subject to the same approval
requirement, 85 and neither or both parties have a place of business in the
State, the provisions are silent on the question of who must apply for the
necessary permission.
The party who has the duty to apply for the approval must
exercise best efforts by applying without undue delay and, if reasonable,
86
exercise available processes for appeal if the approval is not obtained.
As elsewhere in these Principles, there is an emphasis on
communication. 87 Unless information regarding the need for approval is
generally accessible, the existence of the need for permission must be
disclosed by the party whose duty it is to obtain it.88 Failure to disclose is
89
a breach of the obligation of good faith inherent in all negotiations.
Similarly, if the approval is granted or denied, this party must, without
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
1990).
86.

See, e.g., Bettini v. Gye, 1 Q.B. 183 (Eng. 1876).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 74, § 269 cmt. a
See UNIDROIT PRNCIPLES, supra note4, art. 6.1.14(a).
See id. art. 6.1.14(b).
See, e.g., Oak Bee Corp. v. N.E. Blankman & Co., 551 N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (App. Div.
See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, art. 6.1.14 cmt. 4; see also id. art. 6.1.16 cmt.

1.
87. See id. art. 6.1.14 cmt. 2.
88. See id.
89. See id. art. 2.15(a). The obligation of good faith and cooperation in performance may
also be implicated. See id. arts. 5.2, 5.3.
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undue delay, notify the other.90 Failure to notify constitutes a breach of
contract. 91
What are the consequences of refusal of an approval that has been
diligently sought? The text is not totally clear. One reading is that if the
contract is subject to governmental approval, it is as though no contract
ever came into being.92 This makes governmental approval similar to the
often criticized common law concept of a condition precedent to the
existence of a contract. 93 If, however, the lack of approval makes the
contract impossible to perform, for example, if a building permit is
denied, the rights of the party are governed by the rules governing
contractual breaches, including the defense of force majeure.94 If only a
term of the contract fails to receive approval, the contract as a whole
survives if it is reasonable to excise the offending term and regard the
balance of the contract as a transaction the parties would have agreed to if
95
they knew of the impediment.
D.

Hardship

The provisions on "hardship" contained in the chapter on
performance 96 should be compared with the provision on "force
majeure," contained in the chapter on nonperformance. 97 The rule of
force majeure is draconian and unforgiving. Nothing short of total
impossibility will excuse nonperformance or partial nonperformance. 98
Impracticability will not suffice as an excuse. Rather, impracticability as
well as hardship far short of impracticability must be tested under the
hardship articles. Hardship alone never forgives nonperformance. It
instead compels renegotiation and authorizes courts to "adapt" (revise)
the contract to take the hardship into account. 99 Nonetheless, the
hardship provision starts with the caption:
"Contract[s] to be
observed." 1°° Article 6.2.1 provides that "[w]here the performance of a
contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that party is
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id. art. 6.1.15(2).
Seeid. arL 6.1.15cmt.5.
See id.art. 6.1.17(1).
See, e.g., CORBIN, supranote 39, § 589.
See UNIDROlT PRINCIPt.S, supra note4, art. 6.1.17 cmt. 2(b).
See id.art. 6.1.17 cmt. 2(a).
See id.art. 6.2.1-6.2.3.
See id art. 7.1.7.
See supra Part V.A.
See UNIDROIT PR ClNcmS, supra note 4, art. 6.2.3.
Id. at. 6.2.1.
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nevertheless bound to perform its obligations subject to he following
provisions on hardship."
Hardship: The FactualPredicate
The definition of hardship, which appears in Article 6.2.2, is
complex, because it not only defines the nature of the burden, but also
other factors that must coexist with the burden to make it legally relevant.
As a predicate to legally relevant hardship there must have been "the
occurrence of events fundamentally alter[ing] the equilibrium of the
contract either because the cost of a party's performance has increased or
because the value of the performance a party receives has
diminished .... 101 When is the equilibrium of a contract fundamentally
altered? "[A]n alteration amounting to 50% or more of the cost or the
value of the performance is likely to involve a 'fundamental' alteration"
justifying invocation of the doctrine. 10 2 Thus, one illustration involves a
ten-year contract for the sale of uranium at fixed prices in U.S. dollars
payable in New York. The currency in the buyer's country declines to 1%
of the value that it had at the time of contracting. The buyer cannot
invoke force majeure. 10 3 Similarly, if the price is increased tenfold
because some Texans have almost cornered the market, force majeure is
not present. 104 Nonetheless, the buyer may have redress under the
hardship provisions. As a factual matter, hardship exists if the
"equilibrium of the contract" is "fundamentally altered" by events that
occur or become known after contracting. 105 As with the case of
impossibility, hardship as a fact does not automatically trigger the
juridical concept of hardship. In addition, it must be shown that the
events could not reasonably have been taken into account, are not within
the party's control, and the risk was not assumed. 10 6 Consequently, in the
two illustrations just described, a prima facie claim of hardship is made
out. 107 The following example of hardship-in-fact is given in illustration
101. ld art. 6.2.2.
102. IkL cmt. 2; see also art. 6.2.3 illus. 1.
103. See id. art. 7.1.7 illus. 1(1). This is not a draconian result if the buyer can pass the

inflationary costs onto the ultimate consumer.
104. See id. art. 7.1.7 illus. 1(3).
105. See id. art. 6.2.2.
106. See id.
107. My conclusion about the currency collapse case is supported by illustration 3 to article
6.2.2 where on similar facts hardship is said to exist. However, a similar currency example exists in
illustration 1(1) to article 7.1.7 dealing with force majeure. This second illustration concludes that
the parties have allocated the risk by the payment terms. The two illustrations seem to contradict
each other on the question of what is an assumed risk.
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1 of article 6.2.2 of the Principles. A dealer in the former German
Democratic Republic contracts to buy electronic goods from a seller in
another former Communist country. Prior to delivery, the German
Democratic Republic is unified with the Federal Republic of Germany.
There is no market for the kinds of electronic goods produced by the
seller. Unless other factors dictate a contrary conclusion, the buyer may
108
invoke the doctrine of hardship.
It has been suggested that greater hardship would be needed to
trigger the hardship provisions if the obligation is an obligation to achieve
a specific result than where the obligation is to exercise best efforts. 109
"The events could not reasonablyhave been
taken into accountby the disadvantagedparty
at the time of the conclusion
of the contract...."110
As is the case with allegations of force majeure, foreseeability is a
central concern in hardship cases. The general notion is that if an event is
foreseeable, the parties should deal with it in the contract; otherwise, the
party disadvantaged by the event should bear its burden. Yet, as stated
above, 111 almost everything that ever happens is in some sense
foreseeable. Again, the question is whether the event was so outside the
bounds of probability that reasonable parties would not provide for it.
The Principles give two illustrations of the foreseeability issue. The first
involves a contract for the purchase of crude oil at a fixed price for a fiveyear term from country X, "notwithstanding the acute political tensions in
the region." 112 Two years later, war erupts in neighboring countries,
causing a world energy crisis and oil prices rise drastically. 113 The seller
cannot invoke the doctrine of hardship because "a rise in the price of
crude oil was not unforeseeable." 114 The second illustration involves a
contract for sale where the price is expressed in the currency of country
X.115 This currency was depreciating slowly prior to contracting. One
108. See id. art. 6.2.2 illus. 1. For a discussion of cases of force majeure and hardship related
to the collapse of East Germany, see Dietrich Maskow, Hardshipand Force Majeure, 40 AM. J.
ComP. L. 657,665-69 (1992).
109. See Veytia, supranote 41, at 1205-06.
110. UNIDROlT PRNCIpES, supra note 4, art. 6.2.2(b).
111. See supra text accompanying note 63.
112. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPES, supra note 4, art. 6.2.2 illus. 2.
113. See id
114. Id.
115. See id.art. 6.2.2 illus. 3.
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month later the currency depreciated by 80% in the aftermath of a
political crisis.1 16 If other circumstances do not dictate a contrary result,
117
this constitutes legally relevant hardship.
"The events are beyond the control
of the disadvantagedparty .... "118
The Principles give no illustration of this subdivision. I will
construct a hypothetical. A middleman contracts to deliver goods in the
future that he does not have and has no contract with a supplier for the
acquisition of them. He could immediately contract for the goods from
a manufacturer at a price that would make the resale profitable. Instead,
speculating that the manufacturer will lower its price, the middleman
takes no action to secure the goods. Because of changing market
conditions, the manufacturer raise its prices dramatically. The middleman
can only fulfill its contract at a considerable loss. Hardship cannot be
invoked, because the reseller could have avoided the loss by promptly
entering into a contract with the manufacturer.
"The risk of the events was not assumed
by the disadvantagedparty."1 19
The contract may expressly allocate the risk of supervening
hardship, in which case the contract itself supersedes the rules of hardship
in the Principles. However, it is clear from the nature of the hardship
doctrine, that, unlike American law, 120 the mere fact that the contract
contains a fixed price does not allocate that risk. The allocation must be
express, or be inherent in the nature of the contract. Thus, if the contract
is aleatory, such as a contract of insurance, the obligor cannot complain
that the risk has occurred, even though the occurrence far exceeded what
had been foreseen. Thus, if an insurer writes a policy covering the risks
of war and civil insurrection, it must honor the policy even if war and
12 1
civil insurrection breaks out in three countries in the same region.
The Principles allow the parties broad autonomy to determine the
terms of their relationship. The grounds for invoking hardship may be
116. See id.
117. Seeid.
118. Id. art. 6.2.2(c).
119. l art. 6.2.2(d).
120. See, e.g., Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 275
(7th Cir. 1986).
121. See UNIDROLT PRINCIPLs, supra note 4, art. 6.2.2 illus. 4.
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broadened or reined in by the terms of the contract. 122 Indeed, as the
chairman of the working group that drafted the Principles has noted,
"parties are expected to specify in more detail ... the contingencies which
justify invoking hardship and force majeure, not the least because the
consequences deriving from them are fundamentally different." 123
E.

The Effects of Hardship

If performance has become excessively onerous, the party so
burdened is entitled to request negotiations to adapt the contract to the
changed circumstances. 124 The request should be made without "undue
delay," 125 but a delayed request is not automatically excluded. 126 Again,
the Principles stress communication, therefore, it is important that the
request state the grounds for the request, unless those grounds are
obvious. 127 If the hardship claim is justified, the other party is obligated
to negotiate in good faith to adapt the contract to alleviate the burden.
"[A] party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is liable
for the losses caused to the other party." 128 In the event the parties do not
reach agreement, either party may apply to the court. 129
An important question is whether the party who claims hardship
may suspend performance until the contract is modified by agreement or
by the court. The black letter text states that "[t]he request for
renegotiation does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged party to withhold
performance."' 130 The commentary is consistent with the text in stating
that suspension of performance is permissible "only in extraordinary
circumstances." 131 However, the illustration consists of an ordinary kind
of hardship in a construction case. 132 New safety regulations require the
122. See id art. 6.2.2 cmt. 7.
123. BONEU, INTERNATIONALRESTATEmiENT, supra note 23, at 119.
124. See UNIDROITPRINCIPLES,supranote 4, art. 6.2.3(1).
125. Id
126. See id cmt. 2.
127. See id.cmt. 3.
128. Id art 2.15(2); see also id. arts. 1.7 (general duty of good faith) & 5.3 (duty of
cooperation).
129. See id art. 6.2.3(3). Of course, by agreement of the parties expressed in the original
contract or at the time of the alleged hardship, the matter may be taken to arbitration. See generally
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AND RELATED SERVICES OFFERED
BY THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE-CENrRE FOR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE-

ADAPTATION OF CONTRACrS-CoNCIUIATION (1983).
130. UNIDROlTPRINCIPLES, supra note4, art. 6.2.3.

131. Id cmt. 4.
132. See id. cmt. 4, illus. 4.
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installation of additional equipment. 133 The illustration indicates that the
contractor may "withhold the delivery of the additional apparatus, for so
long as the corresponding price adaptation is not agreed."' 134 Assuming,
absent the hardship defense, the contractor is obligated to install the
apparatus, the circumstances do not seem very "extraordinary."
If the court finds that legally redressable hardship exists, it can
terminate the contract, or revise it to restore the equilibrium of the
contract. 135 The commentary indicates that the court has great flexibility
in its power to terminate or revise. 136 The termination may be on such
terms as the court deems just. 137 It should be noted that in many cases,
the reliance interest of the party not burdened by hardship ought to be
redressed. Revision need not always be a price adjustment. An
138 Of
illustration suggests that the place of delivery could be changed.
course, there is a strong possibility that a court will refuse to revise the
contract by a declaration that the contract be performed as originally
agreed.
F

Common Law Comparisons

Compelled renegotiation and judicial reformation of the bargain
are not in the mainstream of the Common Law. 139 One case of
reformation 140 and one case of compelled renegotiation' 4' have been the
raw materials for serious scholarly urging of more of the same. 142 In a
well-argued article, Professor Speidel has concluded that when a long133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See id. art. 6.2.3(4).
136. See id. art. 6.2.3.(4) cmt.7.
137. Seeid.
138. Id. art. 6.2.3 cmt. 7, illus. 5. An American lawyer would most likely see this illustration
as a case of impossibility caused by supervening legal prohibition.
139. The U.S. government has intervened to pressure financial institutions to revise loan
contracts with foreign governments. See Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the
Secondary Market and its Implicationsfor Future Restructuring, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2701
(1996).
140. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
141. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.
Va. 1981), further proceedings 597 F. Supp. 1456 (E.D. Va.1984), ajfd in part, rev'd in part,826
F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,485 U.S. 102 (1988).
142. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, Modification and Adaptation of Contracts:
American Legal Developments, in ADAfATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF CoNmcrs IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 31 (Norbert Horn ed., 1985) [hereinafter ADAPTATION AND
RENEGOTIATION]; Richard Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Tenn Supply
Contracts,76 Nw. U. L. REV. 369 (1981).
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term supply contract is disrupted by changed conditions, "[a]t a
minimum, the advantaged party should have a legal duty to negotiate in
good faith. At a maximum, he should have a legal duty to accept an
'equitable' adjustment proposed in good faith by the disadvantaged
party." 143 His conclusion approximates the law in countries such as
Argentina, 144 Germany and Italy, 145 and the provisions of the Principles.
Professor Spiedel's solution does not receive a great deal of support from
American case law or scholarly literature. 146 One reason for the
difference between the common law and the modem civil law approach is
that the leading common law countries have not suffered from the
unmanageable inflation that has ravaged much of the civil law world, but
American law should realize that international trade is different from
domestic trade and the modem civil law solution formulated in the
Principles deserves respect. It should also be noted that there is a trend
beyond the UNIDROIT Principles to the effect that excessive hardship is
a ground for relief. The Commission on European Contract Law has
formulated a rule that is basically the same as UNIDROIT's. 147 In
England, perhaps the staunchest bastion of pacta sunt servanda,the Law
Commission's proposed "Contract Code," 148 contains a comparable

143. Speidel, supranote 142, at 404-05.
144. See Haracio A. Grigera Na6n, Adaptation of Contracts: An Argentine Substantive and
PrivateInternationalLaw Outlook, in ADAPrATION AND RENEGOTIATION, supra note 142, at 55, 58
(describing the doctrine of imprdvision).
If an unforeseen and extraordinary change of circumstances takes place such
that the performance of a party's obligations becomes excessively burdensome,
such party may sue to obtain the contract's termination. The other party thus
sued may try to avoid such a termination by offering at his expense an adequate
economic improvement of the obligations; however, it shall be up to the judge
to finally decide the issue.
Id.
145. See Norbert Hom, Changes in Circumstancesand the Revision of Contracts in Some
EuropeanLavs and in InternationalLaw, in ADAPTATION AND RENEGOTIATION, supra note 142, at
15,22-23.
146. One leading American scholar favors adaptation under carefully circumscribed
circumstances. See generally Robert A. Hillman, CourtAdjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An
Analysis Under Modem Contract Law, 1967 DUKE LJ. 1. Another commentator finds the
UNIDROIT Principles on hardship to be a "significant advance." See Barton S. Selden, Lex
Mercatoria in European and U.S. Trade Practice: Time to Take a CloserLook, 2 ANN. SURVEY OF
INT'L& COMP. L. 111, 123 (1995).

147.

See COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CoNTRACr LAW, PRINCImLES OF EuROPEAN CONTRAcr

LAW art. 2.1117 (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1995).
148. See HARVEY MCGREGOR, CONTRACT CoDE DRAWN UP ON BEHALF OF THE ENGLISH LAW

COMMISSION (1993).
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provision. 149 Should we doubt that these documents show the direction
of the law of the next century?

149. Circumstances have radically changed where it would be unfair for one contracting
party to require the other to perform; and in deternining whether it would be unfair, account shall
be taken of whether one contracting party has made a reasonable offer to modify the terms of the
contract in the light of the changed circumstances and of the other party's response to that offer. See
id. § 595.

